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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Note is to explore the issues surrounding parental
consent for a surgical invasion of one child to save the life of a sibling.
Historically, the courts have been hesitant to interfere with the parental
duty to provide for a child's welfare.' The right of parents to make medical
decisions for their children is based in the common law and the consti-
tutional right of privacy in child-rearing. It has long been assumed that
parents will act in the best interest of their children with regard to
medical care.2 However, due to the progress of medical science in the field
' ROBERTA GOTTESMAND, THE CHILD AND THE LAW (1981).
2 Id. at 58. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Supreme
Court held that the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitations if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child. Family members are most likely to
know the preferences of the patient and other family members. On the other
hand, they are more likely than others to be emotionally and psychologically
disturbed by a patient's impending death. Guilt or other emotions might lock
them into a narrow perspective to inject improper considerations into their death
control or organ donation decisions. See MICHAEL H. SHAPIRo & Roy G. SPECE,
JR., CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND LAW (1981). See, e.g., In
re Philip B., 92 Cal. App.3d 796 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); Zoski
v. Gaines, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 892a,
comment b (1979).
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of organ transplantation, a new and complicated set of legal issues has
been created.3 An examination of these issues will involve a historical
review of organ donation4 by minors.
This Note focuses on the courts role in permitting organ transplanta-
tion. In addition, it will discuss the new developments in medical science
regarding living donors and the concept of transplantation of regenerative
organs and the possible impact on the court. Next, this Note analyzes the
elements of duty to rescue, best interest and substituted judgment and
the court's use of the various tests to justify invasion of a child's body.
This Note examines a recent case in Illinois5 in which the court was
presented with a unique and unprecedented issue: whether a state in-
terest exists when parents cannot agree in determining if their child
should undergo an invasive procedure to save the life of another.6 Finally,
this Note concludes by considering the future implications in organ do-
nation circumstances which may result in judicial interventions to save
the life of another.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MINOR ORGAN DONATION
A. Organ Transplantation
From its earliest clinical application, the practice or development of
organ transplantation has been particularly influenced by its social en-
vironment. Unlike other fields, in which a drug or device could be de-
veloped, perfected, and manufactured in an isolated laboratory and then
applied to patient care, organ transplantation requires the breaking-down
of deep-seated cultural, religious, mythic and ethnic barriers.7 Trans-
plants require donors; donation requires public support.
3 Russell W. Strong, et al., Successful Liver Transplantation from a Living
Donor to Her Son, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1505 (1990).
4 The term "donation" used in organ transplantation has a different meaning
than does a traditional definition of donation. Donation means "the action of
making a gratuitous gift or free contribution especially to a charity, humanitarian
cause, or public institution." WEBSTER 3RD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 672(3rd ed. 1982). In the organ transplantation context an organ donor is defined as
"an individual from whom blood, tissue, or an organ is taken for transplantation."
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 463 (25th ed. 1982). See infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
6 1d.
During the last ten years, there have been controversial drugs that have been
manufactured and developed which have also been affected by their social en-
vironment. RU 486 or the "abortion pill" developed in France has galvanized
many groups in the United States to lobby against its introduction in this country.
Dorothy Wickenden, Drug of Choice: the Side Effects of RU 486, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, 24 at 26.
The development of the drug AZT has also been dramatically affected by its
social environment. Because AZT is used to treat AIDS, the drug was at the
center of a social controversy. As the AIDS epidemic spread, the need for AZT
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Organ transplantation is the procedure of removing an organ from the
body of one human being and transferring it to the body of another.8
Organ and tissue transplantation is an ancient concept. Organ and tissue
transplantation was initially performed in 3000 B.C. by the Egyptians
and Hindus when they transplanted skin to restore noses destroyed by
syphilis. 9 At the start of the twentieth century, Dr. Charles Guthrie trans-
planted a dog's head onto another dog.'0 Reports of the time indicated
that a heart, lungs, kidneys, thyroid and ovaries of a dog had also been
transplanted, although the dog did not survive for a long period of time."
The development of transplantation medicine was dependent on a series
of scientific advances. They included: (1) the capability to connect blood
vessels; (2) advances in blood banking and tissue typing; 12 (3) the im-
proved understanding of vital organ and immune system 3 functions; (4)
strides in controlling infectious disease; (5) development of radiologic
increased and the social pressure to release this drug to the infected population
also increased. However, just as AZT was an experimental and controversial drug
now accepted by society, RU 486 still has not been accepted by society in this
country, despite the fact that abortion is legal. See Robert Steinbrook & Marlene
Cimons, Scientists Poised To Test AIDS Vaccines on Humans, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
29, 1987, § 1, at 1 and Larry Jacobs, Fighting AIDS All The Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1989, § 6, at 42.
1 Transportation is defined as: "grafting; implanting in one part a tissue or
organ taken from another part or another person." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcTION-
ARY 1472 (4th Unabridged Lawyer's ed. 1976).
9 J. Englebert Dunphy, M.D., The Story of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 67 (1969).
"0 Id. It was reported that the operation was successful but the dog remained
alive only a few hours.
11Id. Dr. Guthrie published a complete report of his findings in 1912 which
indicated the organ transplants were short-term.
12 Tissue typing refers to the identification of genetic expression of similarities
and differences in tissues. Each of us has two genes on the 6th chromosome, one
of which is inherited from each parent. The genes can define many different
markers, making it unlikely that two unrelated persons will have identical an-
tigenic markers.
The HLA (human leukocyte antigen) system describes markers present on
body tissues other than red cells, and the capacity of the body to react to those
markers transplanted on it. HLA typing refers to the identification of HLA mark-
ers (antigens) on blood cells called lymphocytes. Charles H. Kirkpatrick, M.D.,
Chapter 22 Transplantation Immunology, 258 J.A.M.A., 2993 (1987); JAMES T.
BARRETT, PH.D., TEXTBOOK OF IMMUNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO IMMUNOCHEM-
ISTRY AND IMMUNOBIOLOGY, 279-82, (5th ed. 1988); See also Christine Gorman,
Matchmaker, Find Me A Match, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 60; and Harold M.
Schmeck, Jr., Studies Unravel Role of Genetic Markers in Disease Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1985, § C, at 1.
13The immune system is composed of cells and chemicals contained in the
blood which attack substances recognized as foreign, such as infectious organisms,
some malignant tissues, and transplanted tissue. JAMES T. BARRETT, PH.D., TEXT-
BOOK OF IMMUNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO IMMUNOCHEMISTRY AND IMMUNOLOGY
(5th ed. 1988).
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hardware and techniques; and (6) biological1 4 and chemical 15 methods of
altering immune system response in order to allow the body to accept the
organ transplant.
The second half of the twentieth century has seen ardent study and
extraordinary success in many areas of organ transplantation. Twentieth-
century transplantation focused first on the kidney. The artificial kidney
was developed to sustain life, while medical researchers demonstrated
that live organ kidney transplants from identical twins worked. One twin
could donate a kidney and live normally while giving the recipient twin
a new lease on life. Since the donor and recipient were genetically iden-
tical, the immune system would not attack the transplanted kidney and
rejection 16 could not occur.
Transplants of organs like kidneys, skin, bones, blood vessels and cor-
neas have become commonplace since the mid-sixties.17 Also, blood and
its elements, as a form of tissue, have been transplanted from one human
being to another for many years. 8 Through the advent of new medical
technology, more recent success has been seen in the transplantation of
hearts, lungs, bone marrow, pancreas, intestine and livers.
In transplants, organs from living donors are seen to have the most
success. 19 This presents a series of complex issues in both the legal as
1 Biological response to allow body to alter immune system response included
administration of antibodies. These are proteins which are capable of participat-
ing in, and affecting immune response. Id.
1" With the advent of 6-mercaptopurine, azathioprine, and more recently cy-
closporine the body's immune system could be altered to accept a human organ
for transplantation. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Pub.
Health Services, Health Resources & Services, Administration, Task Force on
Organ Transplantation, Report to the Secretary and the Congress on Immuno-
suppressive Therapies 10-14 (1985).
16 "jection is the process by which the recipient's body recognizes transplanted
tissue as foreign and tries to destroy it. Id.
"See supra note 9, at 74.
"Victor Richards, M.D., Medical-legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21
HAsTINGs L.J. 77, 78 (1969).
19 One year survival rate for heart transplant is 82% and for a lung transplant
is 35%. Don Colburn, Transplants: Lack of Organs Is A Big Problem, WASH. POST,
Jan. 30, 1990, Health Section, at Z20. See also Connie Lauerman, Life After
Transplant for Many Organ Recipients, The Surgery's Only The Beginning of An
Emotional Roller-Coaster Ride, CHI. Trhm., May 24, 1987, at 10.
The current survival rate for kidneys from cadaver donors is 91% and for kidney
from living related donors is 96%. Lauerman, supra at 10. Heart transplants have
an average one-year survival rate of 80% -83%. Id. For liver recipients the average
survival rate is 65% - 70% and for pancreas recipients 80%. Id.
If the patient can survive the critical first year then the records for heart
transplant have shown that the recipients have survived more than 16 years,
liver transplants 18 years and some kidney transplants have been living more
than 20 years. Id.
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well as the ethical fields of medicine. Perhaps one of the controversial
areas of this new success in medical technology is the transplantation of
organs and tissue from one sibling to save the life of another sibling and
the possible duty imposed upon a parent to donate an organ or regener-
ative section to their dying child.
20
B. Organ Donation from a Minor
Organ donation from one minor child to another has serious implica-
tions for the courts and society in general. Although society has an in-
terest in the preservation of life for all children, it has an equal interest
in protecting the sanctity of the human body from nonconsensual intru-
sions. 21 In the past, courts have been reluctant to order an organ donation
to save the life of another. Their reasoning has been grounded in the
Constitution by utilizing the concepts of "liberty" and "privacy" rights.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Consti-
tution and possess constitutional rights. '22 Informed consent is frequently
the key to the prevention of liability in transplant operations involving
minors.2 3
Certainly, public policy dictates that the court should uphold values
that preserve the lives of all children. But to what extent can judicial
intervention overcome the sanctity and privacy of one child for the life
of another? Courts have shown they cannot balance the scale in such a
way as to say that when one child is dying, and another is healthy or
incompetent, the healthy or incompetent child should be forced to act to
- Roni Rabin, No Wait With Live Donor Transplants, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1990,
at 23. The seventh experimental live donor liver transplant performed on a child
was successful. The child received a section of her father's liver.
21 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). The company applied
for a court order to compel the defendant to submit to a surgical examination.
The court refused to allow the company to order the defendant to submit to the
examination. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restrain or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law." Id. at 251. See also Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 573 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
1 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
21 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). In this case, an assault and
battery action was filed against a surgeon for damage resulting from the skin
grafting of a 15 year old boy. His aunt, who was not the child's legal guardian,
gave the consent to the operation. The court held the surgeon had no right to
operate on a child without the consent of the child and his guardian or parent.
The operation was not for the benefit of the donor child, but for the donee, his
cousin. Id.
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save the life of the dying child.24 Such analysis would render one's own
constitutional rights,25 including the right to privacy,26 virtually mean-
ingless. It has been held that children enjoy the protection of other con-
stitutional rights including the right of privacy.27
C. Incompetent Minor Donors
Courts have generally held that a patient is competent to make his or
her own medical choices when that patient is capable of the informed
exercise of a choice, which entails an opportunity to evaluate knowl-
edgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each.25 Thus,
competency turns on the patient's ability to function as a decision-maker
acting in accordance with her preferences and values.29 When an incom-
24Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). The court found the kidney
transplant operation from a mentally incompetent brother was necessary to save
the life of a healthy sibling who was suffering from fatal kidney disease. The
court reasoned that with the consent of the mother, the donation of the kidney
from one brother to the other brother was beneficial not only to the transplant
recipient, but to the organ donor because the incompetent brother was emotionally
and psychologically dependant upon his dying brother and the death of the brother
would have a profound negative effect on the incompetent brother. Id. See also
infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
25 Before the Supreme Court used the right to "privacy" to protect individuals
from bodily invasions, the Court used the definition of "liberty" included in the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to include freedom from bodily
restraint. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See supra note
21.
21 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (where a right of personal privacy
exists). See also Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(where the right to privacy is a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government) and Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) (the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions). See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976). The court recognized that the right of privacy was not
absolute, and may be balanced against asserted state interests. Noting that the
state's interest "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims", the court concluded that
the state interests had to give way in that case. 355 A.2d at 664.
Carey v. Population Services Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court held.that:
'"mlinors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess con-
stitutional rights." Id. at 692 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972).
2 United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990).
[Vol. 39:577
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petent individual ° is considered a donor for a transplant procedure, it
must be determined whether the parent or guardian has the power for
consent to the donation of the incompetent's organs, fluids, or tissues for
the transplantation. Courts have found the authority for consent to be
present in some situations and absent in others.3 1 The issue has centered
around the court allowing the transplant of organs from one incompetent
sibling to save the life of another dying sibling.
The most frequently quoted case is Strunk v. Strunk.3 2 Strunk involved
a mentally incompetent ward of the state and his brother who was suf-
fering from a fatal kidney disease. A guardian petitioned the court for
authority to remove a kidney from the incompetent and transplant it into
his ailing brother. The circuit court found the operation necessary and
authorized the donation.33 The appellate court held that the circuit court,
as a court of equity, had the power to permit the kidney transplant, and
affirmed.34 The appellate court relied on the English law doctrine of sub-
30 The word "incompetency" is used to describe the legal status of an individual
who is unable or not fit to manage his own affairs by reason of insanity, imbecility,
or feeble-mindedness and therefore has a guardian or committee to care for him.
See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie, N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985). Black's Law
Dictionary defines "incompetency" as "[a] relative term which may be employed
as meaning disqualification, inability or incapacity and it can refer to lack of
legal qualifications or fitness to discharge the required duty and to show want of
physical or intellectual or moral fitness." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 688 (5th ed.
1979).
11 See cases cited infra note 37.
32 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969). See also supra note 24.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 145-46.
14 Id. at 146. It is important to note that three of the seven judges dissented.
The dissent's opinion is illustrative of the legal, ethical and moral quandary that
faced the court when they attempted to resolve the predicament in Strunk. Judge
Steinfield stated:
Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a government which, to
the everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked on a program of genocide
and experimentation with human bodies I have been more troubled in reach-
ing a decision in this case than in any other. My sympathies and emotions
are torn between a compassion to aid an ailing young man and a duty to
fully protect unfortunate members of society... I am unwilling to hold that
the gates should be open to permit the removal of an organ from an incom-
petent for transplant, at least until such time as it is conclusively demon-
strated that it will be of significant benefit to the incompetent. The evidence
here does not rise to that pinnacle. To hold that committees, guardians or
courts have such awesome power even in the persuasive case before us,
could establish legal precedent, the dire result of which we cannot fathom.
Regretfully, I must say no.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 149-51.
1991]
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stituted judgment 35 and the court's inherent power to act.6 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals believed that the doctrine of substituted judgment could
be extended from the property of an incompetent to his body, thus equat-
ing the human body with property. The court relied on this basis as the
legal basis for ordering the removal of the incompetent's kidney. The
court, while using the doctrine of substituted judgment, also stated that
this procedure was in the best interest of the incompetent and therefore
was justified. The doctrines of substituted judgment and best interest are
interrelated in these circumstances and will be discussed more fully be-
low. The number of cases that have followed since Strunk have been a
mix of decisions regarding removal of an organ from the incompetent to
save the life of another sibling.3 7
D. Substituted Judgment
The substituted judgment doctrine requires the court or guardian to
"[slubstitute itself as nearly as may be for the incompetent, and to act
The court relied upon the English case of Re Earl of Carysfort, 41 Eng. Rep.
418 (184), which concerned a lunatic earl. A servant of the earl had been obliged
to retire by reason of age and infirmity. He did not have the means to support
himself, and the earl was incapable of helping him. On an application to the Lord
Chancellor's court, an order was made for the provision of an annuity out of theincome of the estate of the lunatic earl as a retiring pension to the latter's aged
servant. The court was satisfied that the earl would have approved the gift if he
had been capable of acting himself. Id.
MStrunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148. Although Strunk contains the most detailed
discussion of the doctrine of substituted judgment in incompetent organ donation
cases, the court seems to fall back upon a benefits rule, basing its approval of the
transplant on the benefit that the incompetent donor was likely to derive and not
onthe fact that he would have consented to the transplant if competent. Id. See,
e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).17See In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975). No consent
had been given to the removal by either the incompetent or his guardian ad litem.
The court held that it did not have the power to order the removal of the kidneyfrom the incompetent. See also In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.
1973). The father of a child sought to compel the mother of the child to consent
to surgical removal and transplantation of their minor child's kidney for donation
to the minor's older sister. The court refused to authorize surgical intrusion on
the minor for the purpose of donation of one of his kidneys to his older sister.
Compare Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (the court allowed
the kidney from one twin to be removed and transplanted into the body of the
other twin); In re John Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. 1984) (the evidence showed
that a bone marrow transplant from an incompetent to his brother, would be of
minimal risk to the incompetent and was the only reasonable alternative to savehis brother's life and that the incompetent's brother was sole family member to
have become involved in the placement and treatment decisions for the incom-
petent, the trial court exercised its parens patriae authority to authorize the
transplant).
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upon the same motives and consideration as would have moved her."
38
Under the doctrine of substituted judgment, a guardian of an incompetent
person may look to a person's life history, in all of its complexity, to
ascertain the intentions and attitudes which the incompetent person once
had.
The theory of substituted judgment, which has its origin in English
law,39 was intended to allow courts to make dispositions from the estates
of incompetents to those that the incompetents would have made dispo-
sitions to if competent.40 The right to act for an incompetent, which has
been recognized as the doctrine of substituted judgment, is seen by some
courts to be broad enough to cover all matters touching on the well-being
of a legally incapacitated person. This doctrine has been recognized in
American courts since 1844.41 Most recent cases pertaining to substituted
judgment, nevertheless, have risen in the "right to die" framework, and
the courts have usually concluded that giving effect to the perceived
decision of the incompetent is the proper direction, even though doing so
will result in the incompetent's death.
42
In contemporary times the substituted judgment doctrine has been used
to permit organ donations43 by incompetents." Faced with the issue of
whether to allow the invasion of the incompetent's body and transplant
an organ from the incompetent to save the life of another, courts have
stated that in some instances their equity powers do permit the parents
City Bank v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1944).
- Ex parte Whitebread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). This doctrine empowers a
court of equity to authorize gifts from an incompetent's estate on the sole ground
that the incompetent would choose to do so if he were competent. Courts have
generally used this test in contexts of real or personal property.
40 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1969). The court explained
the inherent equity power of courts in dealing with the affairs of incompetents.
41 Re Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257 (N.Y.Ch. 1844). The court stated that a
chancellor has the power to deal with the estate of an incompetent in the same
manner as the incompetent if he had his faculties.
42 In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J.
1987); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1987); contra Couture v. Couture, 549
N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1989). See generally Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Deci-
sions: Who Makes Them and by What Standards?, 41 RUTGER L. REV. 505 (1989).
* The word "donation" in this context is misleading. Donation implies a freely
given gift and someone who is able to make the gift. In the situation involving
an incompetent, this person is not choosing to make a gift; someone is deciding
for him that the gift is to be made. Donation is the proper term used in this
circumstance, however, it should be understood that the incompetent person is
not donating his or her organ in the literal sense, but allowing another person
to make a judgment on his behalf to permit an organ to be removed and trans-
planted. See supra note 4.
"Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386(Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
1991]
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to consent to organ donations from one sibling to another.45 When an
incompetent person is involved, the issue becomes one of whether the
incompetent could understand the concept of organ donation. In other
words, would the person wish to donate or not wish to donate. When the
court has been faced with this issue, they have used the substitutedjudgment test, which in a simplified context asked what the incompetent
would most likely want if he were competent.
In the case of a minor donor, there is no period of competency upon
which to base a determination of the donor's altruism. Therefore, in ap-
plying the substituted judgment doctrine in a case involving a minor, a
court is simply applying a form of the best interest test. The court is
making a decision based upon its perception of what a reasonable person
would do if he were in the minor's position. When courts have permitted
donation, they have stressed the incompetent's probable anguish at the
sibling's death. 46 Other courts have rejected the claim that the proper test
is whether the incompetent would consent to donate if he could do so,
and have simply refused to authorize the transplant on the grounds it is
not in the best interest of the incompetent. 47
One court discussed the substituted judgment doctrine in the context
of the incompetent's interest and stated:
The 'best interest' of an incompetent person is not necessarily
served by imposing on such persons results not mandated as
to competent persons similarly situated. It does not advance
the interest of the State or the ward to treat the ward as a
person of lesser status or dignity than others ... Nor do sta-
tistical factors indicating that a majority of competent persons
' Three unreported cases in Massachusetts stated that a court of equity doeshave the power to permit the natural parents of minor twins to allow organdonation from one twin to the other. See, e.g., Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass.Sup. Jud. Ct. filed Nov. 13. 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 (Mass. Sup.Jud. Ct. filed Aug. 29, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
filed June 14, 1957).
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-47; Hart J. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn.Super. Ct. 1972); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). InStrunk the court stated:
under the peculiar circumstances of this case it would not only be beneficialto Tommy but also beneficial to Jerry [Jerry was the incompetent who wasto donate the kidney to his ill brother] because Jerry was greatly dependent
upon Tommy, emotionally and psychologically, and that his well-being
would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the
removal of a kidney .... A psychiatrist, in attendance to Jerry, who testifiedin the case, stated in his opinion the death of Tommy under these ircum-
stances would have 'an extremely traumatic effect upon him.'
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146.4 7See, e.g., In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (a minor hasthe right to be free from bodily intrusion unless it is in his best interest); In rePescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975) (the court rejected the substituted judg-
ment test and refused to allow the transplant).
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similarly situated choose treatment resolve the issue ... In-
dividual choice is determined not by vote of the majority but
by the complexities of the singular situation viewed from the
unique perspective of the person called on to make the deci-
sion.48
One commentator, speaking in the context of organ donations by in-
competents, explained the rationale behind the substituted judgment ap-
proach as follows:
[M]aintaining the integrity of the person that we act toward
him 'as we have reason to believe [he] would choose for [himself]
if [he] were [capable] of reason and deciding rationally.' It does
not provide a license to impute to him preferences he never
had or to ignore previous preferences ... If preferences are
unknown, we must act with respect to the preferences a rea-
sonable, competent person in the incompetent's situation would
have ... For such an attempt would continue to regard him,
even during his incapacity, as an individual with free choice
and moral dignity, and not as someone whose preferences no
longer mattered. Even if we were mistaken in ascertaining his
preferences, the person [if he later became competent, as in the
case of some children] could still agree that he had been fairly
treated if we had a good reason for thinking he would have
made the choices imputed to him.
49
The traditional approach to the substituted judgment doctrine has di-
rected the judicial reaction to claims of needy relatives upon incompe-
tents, and has allowed depletion of incompetents' estates with no direct
benefit to the incompetents but done solely to help the relatives.
50 As one
commentator has suggested, "[i]f property can be invaded because of min-
imal risk to the incompetent's interest, then presumably the body could
also be invaded if the risks are commensurate." '1
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
428 (Mass. 1977).
49 John A. Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and The Substituted
Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 63 (1976).
See id. at 62.
"Id. "The fact that the substituted judgment doctrine arose as jurisfication
for disposing the property of wealthy lunatics, does not render the doctrine in-
applicable to the transplant situation. The risks to the incompetent from a trans-
plant may be slight, depending on the precise nature of the physical intrusion."
Id. at 62 n.83.
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E. Best Interest Theory
Under the best interest theory, a court will authorize the donation if
it determines that participation in the operation will promote the best
interest of the prospective donor. Best interest is seen as an objective
standard under which the surrogate must ask "what would most reason-
able, competent patients choose under these medical circumstances?"62
Traditionally, courts use this test5 3 whenever they are called upon to make
decisions for incompetent individuals.54 The best interest test has been
used extensively in authorizing beneficial medical treatment for children
whose parents refuse to consent for religious reasons. 55
It has been reasoned that the best interest test is a variation of the
substituted judgment doctrine.5" In applying the best interest test, courts
take into account whether or not the donation would have any benefit
upon the donor by his donating an organ to another sibling. The best
interest test usually applies when donors have made no prior probative
statements regarding their attitudes towards the procedure because they
are either too young or have never been competent. The court relies upon
the guardian of the prospective donor to protect the best interest of either
a young child donor or an incompetent. 57
Il. DOES A PARENT HAVE A DUTY To RESCUE IN
ORGAN DONATION SITUATIONS?
A. The Rescue Doctrine in Organ Donation Circumstances
In analyzing the duty of parents to their children in organ donation
situations, the traditional tort doctrine of rescue has been suggested by
legal scholars as a possibility for the courts to justify the removal of an
organ from either a healthy parent or sibling to be transplanted into the
ill sibling. However, courts have been reluctant to use the rescue doctrine,
52 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
5 The courts use the best interest test or the closely related substituted judg-
ment test. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 35.See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890(1962); People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.), cert. denied, 344U.S. 824 (1952) (each case involved a court ordered blood transfusion to an infant
over the religious objections of the parents).
1 The courts seem to prefer to use the substituted judgment doctrine, but inthe case of small children or people who have been incompetent since birth, it isimpossible to ascertain what the donor would do in the situation. Therefore, the
court leans toward what would seem to be in the best interest of the donor at the
time the organ donation is requested. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill.
1990).
57 In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975). See supra note
37.
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characterized in traditional legal analysis,6 8 to justify organ donations. 59
The legal principle of rescue recognizes the social duty of a citizen to act
positively to attempt to rescue another who is in personal danger.6° Amer-
ican laws have not favored the rescue concept in organ donation cases
86
and have been reluctant to equate moral obligation with legal obliga-
tion.6 2 Courts have generally refused to justify the invasion of one's body
to save the life of another. One court stated:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides
that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid
or to take action to save another human being or to rescue. A
great deal has been written regarding this rule which, on the
surface, appears to be revolting in a moral sense ... In this
case, the chancellor is being asked to force one member of
society to undergo a medical procedure which would provide
that part of that individual's body would be removed from him
and given to another so that the other could live. Morally, this
decision rests with the defendant, and, in the view of the court,
the refusal of defendant is morally indefensible. For our law
to compel the defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body
would change every concept and principle upon which our so-
ciety is founded.
63
5" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44,
at 307 (5th ed. 1984). See, e.g., Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921);
Gibney v. State of New York, 33 N.E. 142 (N.Y. 1893); Eckert v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). See generally 19 A.L.R. 1 (1921).
19 Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). The court held that
the mother, who voluntarily donated one of her kidneys to her son who was dying
of a kidney ailment, had no cause of action against defendant physician.
'o See generally RUSSELL Scor'r, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).
61 Moore v. Shah, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). "A wrong perpetuated
upon a victim is also a wrong to his rescuer and so long as the rescue is not a
rash or wanton act, the rescue doctrine extends a defendant's liability to the
rescuer." Id. at 33. In this case the plaintiff attempted to use the rescue doctrine
to establish the requisite foreseeability between the doctor's negligence in treat-
ment of the father and the injury to himself as the rescuer. The plaintiff argued
that the defendant doctor, knew or should have known, that the plaintiff would
logically be the first person to donate a kidney to his father. See also Wagner v.
Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). "The risk of rescue, if only it be not
wanton, is born of the occasion." Id. at 438.
62 Wagner 133 N.E. at 438. European nations, with a civil law tradition stem-
ming from ancient Rome, have found it much easier to accept the rescue principle.
Id.
" See also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 S.E.2d 457
(Ga. 1981) and Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hospital v. Anderson, 201 A.2d
537 (N.J. 1964) (in both cases the court held that a pregnant woman can be
compelled to accept blood transfusions necessary to perform a cesarean operation
thought to be essential to their child's survival). See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D.
& C.3d 90 (Pa. 1978).
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In traditional rescue cases,6 the rescuer generally acts without "know-
ing his fate".8 Generally, in order to state a claim for relief under the
rescue doctrine, four criteria must be present: (1) there was someone in
peril; (2) the situation was such as to clearly convince a person that human
life or limb was in peril; (3) the rescuer acted for "humanity sake" to
rescue the person from peril; and (4) a person's conduct was that of an
ordinary prudent person under the circumstances. The few states that
have statutorily created a duty to rescue require only such assistance as
can be rendered without danger to the rescuer.67
In the organ donation circumstance, the rescuer acts with full knowl-
edge of the consequences of his action.68 The donor has already been
identified as the one capable of giving the necessary aid.69 The proposed
donor knows his position and knows that without consent, the transplant
cannot take place. By this reasoning, the donor is not just a bystander
whose refusal to consent would be unintentional. However, a prospective
donor cannot know, except as statistical probability, whether a donee will
live or die70 with a new organ. Despite the consent of a donor, there is no
certainty that the donation will save the life of the donee.
6 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 44, at 301 (5th ed. 1984) and cases therein. See generally Mitchell v. Pettigrew,333 P.2d 879 (N.M. 1958); Bond v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 96 S.E. 932 (W.Va.
1981).
" In traditional rescue cases, the rescuer acts to save the life of another without
a complete understanding of the peril to the rescuer himself. Despite the fact thatthe peril of rescue has not been contemplated by the rescuer, he proceeds with
the rescue.
1 McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 432 S.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Mo. 1968).
67 See MINN. STAT. § 604.05.01 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1990).European countries that require rescue generally exempt physically hazardous
rescues. See, e.g., C. Pen. art. 63 (Fr.).
Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S. 709, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). A mother hadthe complete knowledge that she was donating her kidney to save the life of her
child. This is in opposite to traditional rescue cases where the rescuer may notknow to what extent he may have to sacrifice himself to save the life of another.69 Courts use public policy rationales in deciding organ transplant cases with
the rescue doctrine. See, e.g., Sirianni v. Anna, 285 N.Y.S.2d 709, 709. The court
reasoned the mother's donation of her kidney was "willful, intentional, voluntary,
free from accident and with full knowledge of its consequence[s]," and that the
rescue doctrine excludes recovery for a willful act. Id. at 712. See also Moore v.
Shah, 458 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The court based its decision on thedefendant-physician's lack of duty to the kidney donor. The court reasoned aphysician does not have the "responsibility to foresee each and every person other
than his patient who might conceivably be affected by his negligence." Moore,458 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35. See also Peterson v. Farberman, 736 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App.1987). The Peterson court agreed with Moore and Sirianni in reasoning that the
"[Mother's decision to donate a kidney to [save the life of] her son was certainlylaudable, but it does not fall within the purpose of the rescue doctrine." 736 S.W.2d
at 443.
70 See supra note 19.
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B. Duty to Act by the Parent or Another Sibling
With respect to whether there is a duty to act,7' "[g]enerally, one has
no legal duty to aid another person in peril, 72 even when that aid can be
rendered without danger or inconvenience. ' 73 While the common law rec-
ognizes that one has no duty to come to the aid of one in peril, 74 an
exception exists75 if there is a special relationship between the parties.
7 6
One commentator has suggested four criteria to consider in the organ
transplantation context. 77 In order for a plaintiff to prevail in a court-
ordered forced organ donation situation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he is in imminent danger of dying from a disease that
can be treated by transplantation of an organ, tissue or fluid
from another; (2) that he stands to experience substantial ben-
efit from such transplant from the defendant serving as donor;
(3) that transplantation from the defendant is the exclusive
mode of treatment that offers the prospect of substantial benefit
11 Lloyd v. 8.S. Kresge Co., 270 N.W.2d 423 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978); Cole v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 1970). When a special relationship exists
between the parties, social policy may impose a duty to act. Because a parent has
a legal duty to protect a child, breach of this duty may give rise to criminal
liability. See, e.g., State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. 1982).
72 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. 1978). "The common law has
consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no legal
compulsion to give aid or to take action to save another human being or to rescue."
Id. at 91.
" WAYNER. LAFAVE & AusTiN W. ScoTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 203
(1986).
74 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56,
at 375 (5th ed. 1984). The rescue doctrine with its premise of the "no duty to
rescue" rule is often illustrated with highly disturbing examples. For example:
"The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning
before his eyes, is not required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the
dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the man drown." Id. (citing Osterlind v. Hill,
263 Mass. 73 (1928)).
7" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56,
at 377 (5th ed. 1984). One exception provides that one who injures or imperils
another has a duty to render aid. Another exception requires that a person who
begins a rescue attempt to perform it with reasonable care and that they not
abandon the effort if doing so will leave the imperiled person in a worse position
than before. See also WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusrN W. SCOTT, SuBSTANTvE CRnM-
INAL LAw 282 (1986).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314 (1965).
17 Fordham E. Huffman, Comment, Coerced Donation of Body Tissues: Can We
Live With McFall v. Shimp?, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 409,414 (1979). The author developed
criteria based on the court's decision in McFall. Courts will not force an organ
donation to save the life of another. However, the author was hoping the courts
would adopt his criteria and his analytical process of ascertaining the possibility
of organ donation to save the life of another.
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to the plaintiff; and (4) the organ tissue, or fluid sought is
expendable by the donor-given the quality of tissue or fluid
to be removed and its regenerative capacity-and that the re-
moval of the organ, tissue, or fluid will not result in disfigure-
ment.
78
It must be noted however, that the courts have not chosen to follow the
above suggested criteria and there is no indication that these suggestions
will be adopted in the near future. In fact, the courts have resolutely
turned their backs to this reasoning.79
The common law, nevertheless, does impose affirmative duties upon a
person standing in certain relationships to another.'* For example, par-
ents have a duty to aid their children.81 Given the history of the rescue
doctrine and the courts historical reluctance to use it, it is doubtful that
parents would be ordered to donate organs to their child even if the refusal
would mean the child's certain death. However, if medical science ad-
vances to the point where an organ donation is not considered a risk8 2 to
the donor, the courts might entertain a legal argument attempting to
justify the donation under the rescue doctrine.
78 See id. at 415-16. See also In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180
(Wis. 1975). In this case the dissent proposed a test for organ transplantation
from minor or incompetent donors: (1) the donee would die without it; (2) there
have been reasonable steps to obtain a transplant from other sources and these
have failed; (3) the minor and recipient are related so as to infer that if the minor
were competent that he would consent to the transplant; (4) the donor is in good
health; and (5) there is "minimal" risk to the donor and a finding that he could
function without the donated organ, fluid or tissue. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 183.
7 See supra notes 36 and 47.
bo WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 203
(1986).
-' Commonwealth v. Konz, 450 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1982). The inherent dependency
of a child upon his parent to obtain medical aid, i.e., the incapacity of a child to
evaluate his condition and summon aid by himself supports imposition of such a
duty upon the parent. Id. at 641. See also Robey v. State, 456 A.2d 953 (Md. 1983);
State v. Crawford, 196 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1972); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d
358 (N.Y. 1973) and Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. C. 56 (Pa. 1915). In all four
cases the parents, believing in prayer rather than in medicine, failed to call the
doctor. See Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 111 (England 1875).
82 Risk in organ donation would be defined as the donor not suffering any long-
term effects from the donation, and living a "normal life" despite the fact that
he has donated a part of his body to save the life of another. Kidney donations
may be considered in this category because while people normally have two
kidneys, they can function and live a normal life with one kidney. The new medical
advances in organ regeneration also could be considered less risky, as the part
of the organ that is removed from the healthy donor will eventually regenerate
to become whole again.
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IV. WILL THE COURT ORDER AN INVASION OF ONE PERSON'S BODY TO
SAVE ANOTHER?
A. Forced Organ Donations
To analyze the courts' possible reasoning in contemplating an order to
allow forced organ donations to save the life of another, and to predict
what length the court may proceed in this area, one must consider the
courts' history in allowing bodily invasions. In considering the concept
of invading a person's body with the justification to save the life of another,
the courts looking to the Constitution, generally oppose such an invasion.
It has long been held that a competent adult's right to be free of unwanted
bodily invasion is firmly grounded in the constitutional right to privacy.8 3
First Amendment rights to religious freedom also support this view.84 In
recent cases 5 however, a woman's constitutional rights have explicitly
been made to yield to the interests of a viable fetus.88 Forced medical
procedures authorized by the courts for the good of the patient are not
uncommon in American law.8 7 In most instances, these procedures have
been requested on behalf of incompetents. Courts have ordered as part
of their inherent power of parens patriae authority88 the sterilization of
an incompetent patient,89 shock treatment,9 0 chemotherapy treatment,91
amputation,92 medication 93 and the removal of artificial life support mech-
anisms.
9 4
The Pennsylvania case of McFall v. Shimp 5 raised the question of a
In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). A party is free to decline life-sus-
taining medical treatment when they are a competent adult. The court balances
patient's common law and constitutional rights against state interests in pre-
serving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profes-
sion and protecting innocent third parties; Bouvia v. Superior Court of L.A.
County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
"Application of President and Director of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), reh'g en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
81 In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
16 See infra note 109.
17 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination is
constitutionally permitted, although it is certainly an infringement of an indi-
vidual's bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy).
8 Parenspatriae means literally: "'parent of the country'. . . refers traditionally
to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
19 In these decisions the courts held that the petition for the sterilization of an
incompetent patient should be granted. See, e.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607
(Alaska 1981); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); In re Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d
989 (N.Y. Supp. 1976); In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
90 Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
- Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977).
In re Schiller, 372 A.2d 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). In re Long Island
Jewish-Hillside Medical Ctr. v. Levitt, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).93 In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
96 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. 1978).
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compelled donation of bone marrow from one adult to another.9 6 Bone
marrow is a regenerative tissue, but its removal requires a surgical pro-
cedure under general anesthetic. The plaintiff was suffering from aplastic
anemia and would die without transfer of compatible tissue. Shimp was
a cousin and the indications were that his tissue might be compatible.
After one encouraging, test Shimp declined to submit to any further
procedures and McFall took action to compel him to submit to further
tests and to the removal of tissue for transfer of bone marrow. The court
assumed jurisdiction but declined to impose the obligation on Shimp,
though it was critical of his refusal because it meant sure death for
McFall 97 In an impassioned opinion the court stated:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to
sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members
and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting
to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible ex-
traction of living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial
mind. Such would raise the specter of the swastika and the
Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors of this portends.9 8
The principle stated was that to compel Shimp to submit to bodily
intrusion "[would defeat the sanctity of the individual and would impose
a rule which would know no limits and one could not imagine where the
line would be drawn."99 Furthermore, as a commentator on the case stated:
the individual is not primarily some kind of social debtor whose
obligations to the community outweigh, or do no more than
balance his rights, powers, and privileges. Society and its laws
should aim to promote personal autonomy and individual lib-
erty. Accordingly my law in relation to tissue removal from
living persons would be expressed positively, not negatively,
and would allow donations of body parts of adults of sound
mind, provided that it is done on the basis of free and informed
consent.' o0
T See also In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). A thirty-three-
year-old adoptee suffering from chronic myelocytic leukemia sought a court order
to open his adoption records so that he could locate a compatible bone marrow
donor. The judge consulted the man's natural mother, who was tested but found
not compatible. The judge then contacted the alleged natural father, whose name
was obtained from the adoption records. The man denied paternity and was un-
willing to be tested for compatibility. The matter stopped there; the court refused
to give the dying man his natural father's name. See also Curran v. Bosze, 566
N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). Bosze asked the court to order Curran, the mother of
Bosze's three-year-old twin children who were born after Bosze and Curran's
relationship ended, to have the twins tested to determine if their bone marrow
was compatible with their half brother's bone marrow. The court refused to compel
the twins to be tested.
10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. 1978). Nothing in the opinion indicates that the
degree of relationship was significant. The holding was based on the sanctity of
the individual. Id. at 91.
8Id. at 92.
See id. at 91.
100 RUSSELL Scorr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 255 (1981).
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However, courts have started to confront the issue of forcing caesarean-
sections to save the life of a fetus. 01 One commentator, who favors forced
caesareans also supports compulsory parental donations of blood, bone
marrow and depending on the degree of risk even organs.' 02 Another
commentator suggested, based on past court decisions,1 0 3 that "[t]here is
a rather stringent duty to prevent or remove harm, or both, to a member
of one's immediate family, a duty that involves significant risk to oneself
and is shared even by members of the family who are incompetent to
shoulder other types of obligations."'1 4 She concludes that cases author-
izing donation by incompetents can constitute a legal precedent, including
organ donation, for the sake of their children, and of course, for analogous
forms of prenatal compulsion.05 In furtherance of this view she stated:
It can thus be argued that Strunk provides a legal precedent
for compelling parents to undergo invasive medical procedures,
including organ donation and fetal surgery, for the sake of their
children. This would make the court decisions compelling preg-
nant women to undergo blood transfusions and caesarean sec-
tions for the sake of their future children less anomalous.1 6
In another related case, 0 7 a district court authorized termination of a
pregnancy of a woman who had been involuntarily retained at the hospital
for treatment of a mental disorder.10 8
To ascertain the future of forced organ donations, a recent court decision
may map out a future course. In In re A.C.,I0 a District of Columbia court
ordered the caesarean delivery of a 26-week old fetus from its terminally
ill mother. The mother, Angela Calder, developed leukemia when she was
13 years old. When she was 27, with her disease in remission, she married
and later became pregnant. When she was 25 weeks pregnant, her phy-
101 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
1o See John Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3
J. LEGAL MED. 333, 354-55 (1982). The author supports mandatory caesareans in
certain circumstances and accepts equivalency in the organ donation context.
This would include mandatory parental donation of blood, bone marrow and
organs.
103 See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
-o' Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State
Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 43-44 (1985).
10 Id. at 44. Mathieu claims that one of the deciding factors in Strunk was the
obligation of one family member to undergo risks for another, though she notes
that this factor was not stated in the case.
106 Id.
107 Lefegvre v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
108 Id. at 568. The appellate court reversed based on statutory grounds but
indicated that the court had the power to terminate the pregnancy as requested
by the hospital if the proper procedures were followed.
109 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and remanded, 539 A.2d 203
(D.C. 1988), In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (en banc) (D.C. 1990).
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sicians discovered a tumor mass in Angela's lung, and she was admitted
to the hospital in a terminal condition. At the point Angela was admitted
to the hospital, her unborn child was considered to be just barely "viable"
as the term is used in Roe v. Wade.110
The trial court ordered that the child be delivered surgically. In its
opinion, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals attempted to explain
the reasons for its decision to deny a stay of the trial court's order. First,
the court recognized that, in most circumstances, an adult's right to bodily
integrity precludes the state's intervening in health care decisions."'
However, the interest in "protecting innocent third parties from the ad-
verse consequences of an adult's decision to refuse medical treatment"
may override this right.112 Next the court examined cases that have ap-
plied this doctrine where the "innocent third party" was as yet unborn." 3
The court recognized that court-ordered treatment of the mother to save
the child does indeed "infringe on the mother's right to bodily integrity."'1 4
After applying these rationales to the dying Angela Calder's situation,
the court held that the trial judge had not erred in subordinating Angela's
right to privacy to the "interests of the unborn child and the state," since
she had, at best, two days left of sedated life." 5 The debate in A.C. and
the related cases"' seems to focus on the issue of benefit to the mother,
either directly or indirectly, from treatment and instances where the
mother is dying and will not benefit." 7
In 1990, two years after the death of Angela and her baby, the court
of appeals, on remand, held that the patient should decide what will be
done on behalf of herself and her child. The court stated that, "[i]f the
patient is incompetent or otherwise unable to give an informed consent
to a proposed course of medical treatment, then her decision must be
ascertained through the procedure known as substituted judgment."" 8
110 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). The holding in Roe, that a "viable"
fetus' interest may be as compelling as the mother's in elective abortion, may
have been misconstrued and improperly applied in the context of court-ordered
interventions to benefit children not being aborted. (The United States Supreme
Court recently accepted certiorari of Planned Parenthood v. Carey, 947 F.2d 682
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 117 L.E.2d 104 (1992). This decision may have an
effect on Roe. This Note will be published before the Supreme Court decision in
Case]y can be evaluated in the context of this Note.) See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen,
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986). Courts have not,
however, ordered treatment for the mother when the fetus is clearly at the stage
of pre-viability. See, e.g., Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983). The court
refused to order ciclage, or "purse string" operation, for incompetent cervix. Taft
at 395.
" In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1988).
112 Id.
" Id. at 617.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Superior Ct. 1986), af'd,
D.C. Court of Appeals in unreported order, cited in In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613;
In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
117 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
"I In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
[Vol. 39:557
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss4/7
DUTY TO PRESERVE LIFE
The court reasoned that the trial court did not follow the doctrine of
substituted judgment and therefore the order was vacated and remanded
for further proceedings. 119 However, the court of appeals stated, "[wle do
not quite foreclose the possibility that a conflicting state interest may be
so compelling that the patient's wishes must yield, (footnote omitted) but
we anticipate that such cases will be extremely rare and truly excep-
tional. '120 '"This is not such a case. ' '121 The court of appeals again reiterated
its position with respect to consent by a patient to either refuse or accept
treatment, thereby leaving the door open for the possibility of cases that
would allow the fetus to be taken without the consent of the mother.
1 22
One commentator has focused on the issues considered in A.C. and the
analogy between organ/tissue donation cases.123 He states:
[i]nterpreting captivity is difficult, but if it means a lack of
alternatives, and if dependence is interpreted as the necessity
of surgical procedure on a person's body to sustain another
person (rather than simply a matter of location necessitating
particular bodily life support), then it is unclear why a mother
(or father) shouldn't be ordered to provide bone marrow, or
perhaps even a kidney, if a coerced cesarean section is justifi-
able. After all, a mother has brought the child into the world
and even though the child now exists in physical independence,
it may depend on the mother for survival in the absence of any
other compatible donors for an organ (perhaps a portion of a
liver) just as much as the unborn child. 24
Courts have shown that they will use their authority to order a variety
of medical procedures against the wishes of parents, particularly when
the life and health of children are involved. Parents and other legal
guardians generally have not been given the authority to refuse medical
care for their minor children if such care is necessary for life. This has
been true, even if parental objections are made on religious grounds,
provided there is both a strong medical consensus favoring treatment and
a good prognosis. 125 In general, these matters have been litigated and
adjudicated when the need for a particular therapeutic measure was im-
minent. Recently, however, courts have'shown a willingness to extend
their preemption of parental authority to situations involving fairly long-
term care and even prophylaxis. 126
119 Id. at 1237.
120 Id. at 1252.
121 Dena S. Davis, Reflections on A.C., 2 BIOLAw § 448, 1990. (quoting In re
A.C., No. 87-609, D. C. Ct. App., April 26, 1990, at 38).
122 Id. See also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1253-59 (D.C. 1990) (Belson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123 James F. Childress, Analogical Reasoning: Organ/Tissue Donation and Cae-
sarean Section, 5 BIOLAw § 443 (1990). See also Davis, supra note 121.
124 See Childress, supra note 123, at 445-446.
125 See, e.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1974); In re Cicero, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
126 See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); In re Cabrera,
552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. 1989).
1991]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
In re Eric B.,' 27 for example, involved a three-year-old who had origi-
nally been placed in protective custody under the California child pro-
tection laws when his parents refused post-operative chemotherapy and
radiation therapy for Eric's cancer of the retina.128 The court initially
ordered a regimen of chemotherapy, radiation, and spinal taps.
About one year later, in a periodic review hearing, the attending phy-
sician testified there was no evidence of recurrence of the cancer. However,
the physician nevertheless believed that Eric would be at risk unless
procedures were ordered. The parents stated that, without court inter-
vention, they would supply Eric with Christian Science care and treat-
ment. The referee's order, which was upheld by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, required the parents to submit to monitoring of Eric. Because
substantial evidence supported a finding that the child faced an appre-
ciable risk of harm from a potentially deadly disease, the appellate court
held that the juvenile court was empowered to prevent the possibility of
harm to the child. 1
29
Similarly, a Pennsylvania Superior Court recently upheld the appoint-
ment of a hospital as special guardian of a six-year-old with sickle cell
anemia. 130 The special guardian was given continuing authority to con-
sent to blood transfusion therapy as needed for one year.'3' The court
noted that the minor need not be "at death's door" for court intervention
to be justified, although there must be some "peril" of a fairly serious
nature.
32
Because of the Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,13 a prediction has been made that this decision now
allows state legislatures to assert that life begins at conception 3 4 which
could support judicial activism along the lines of In re A.C. and, therefore,
the implication could be drawn into the organ donation context. Until
the Supreme Court is challenged by a situation using the principles in
Webster to support a request for an organ donation in the context of In
re A.C., we will not know Websters implications as to the future of organ
and tissue donation.
V. CURRAN V. BOSZE: A MODERN APPROACH TO ORGAN DONATION FOR
THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER
In the context of organ donation from parents, siblings and incompe-
tents, the courts seem to follow the general rule of not ordering an in-
vasion of one body to benefit another.3 5 However, as seen in the previous
127 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
128Id.
129Id.
13 In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
131 Id.
132 Id.
13 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
I34 /d.
135 See cases cited supra note 37.
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discussion, courts may start to entertain the idea of coerced organ trans-
plants in certain, but limited, situations. Curran v. Bosze1 8 was a tragic
case and raised a new and unprecedented issue before the Illinois Supreme
Court.
In 1987 Nancy Curran brought an action concerning paternity of twins
against Tamas Bosze. A blood test confirmed that Mr. Bosze was the father
of the three year-old twins and Nancy Curran was the mother. Mr. Bosze
and Ms. Curran were never married. On February 16, 1989, Mr. Bosze
and Ms. Curran entered into an agreed order establishing the parent and
child relationship. The order stated that Ms. Curran would have sole care,
custody, control and educational responsibility of the minor children.
Mr. Bosze has three other children including Jean Pierre Bosze. Jean
Pierre was suffering from acute undifferentiated leukemia. 137 Pierre's
physician recommended that he receive a bone marrow transplant in
order to have any chance of survival.3 8 Without the bone marrow trans-
plant, Pierre would die. 3 9 Upon being informed of this, Mr. Bosze's entire
family was tested for bone marrow compatibility. None of the people tested
proved to be a match for Pierre. Because Mr. Bosze was genetically linked
to both the twins and Pierre, Mr. Bosze then asked Ms. Curran if she
would allow the twins to have a blood test to determine if they were a
suitable match. After consulting with the twin's pediatrician, family
members, parents of bone marrow donors, and bone marrow donors them-
selves, Ms. Curran refused to give consent to the twins undergoing either
the blood test to determine compatibility or the bone marrow harvesting
procedure. Mr. Bosze asked the court to compel the twins to have both
the blood test and, if compatible, the bone marrow harvesting procedure.
This issue was one of first impression for the state of Illinois. 40 The
issue before the court was whether a state interest exists when parents
cannot agree in determining if their children undergo a blood test and if
compatibility is established, the harvesting of bone marrow, not for the
children's benefit, but for the benefit of another.'4 ' The court considered
two primary interests in evaluating and defining the state's role. First,
,311566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
137 Acute undifferentiated leukemia (AUL) also known as mixed lineage leu-
kemia, is a rare form of leukemia which is difficult to treat. Id. at 1321.
138 Several experts in the field of pediatric bone marrow transplantation were
called to testify. One expert stated that given Jean Pierre's present condition and
medical history, success for the transplant procedure was estimated at 25% - 30%
provided the bone marrow donation was from a relative. Curran, 566 N.E.2d at
1338.
139 Dr. Frank Leonard Johnson, a specialist in treating cancer in children,
stated that Jean Pierre's chance of survival would be approximately 5% assuming
the twins were compatible. He also opined that Jean Pierre did not have a chance
to survive the transplant. Id. at 1333.
140 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
141 Id. In discussing this issue, the court also considered the relationship be-
tween the twins and Jean Pierre. This relationship was a key factor in the court's
determining whether the procedure would be in the best interest considering the
family situation.
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the court considered the interest of the three-year old children who were
requested to act as donors. Second, the court considered the interest of
the twelve-year-old child who was in need of the bone marrow transplant.
Since neither twin was competent and did not have the ability to consent,
the state's interest in not allowing bodily intrusion was compelling, and
the twins' rights were to be protected. The circuit court would not allow
a coerced blood test or bone marrow harvesting procedure. 42
In reaching its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the two
doctrines associated with the donation of organs: the substituted judg-
ment doctrine and the best interest test. 143 The court reasoned that the
age of the twins precluded the court from using the substituted judgment
doctrine'" as the doctrine of substituted judgment requires clear and
convincing proof of the incompetent person's intent before a court may
authorize a surrogate to substitute his or her judgment' for that of the
incompetent. 45 The court further stated that:
[n]either justice nor reality is served by ordering a 3 1/2-year-
old child to submit to a bone marrow harvesting procedure for
the benefit of another by a purported application of the doctrine
of substituted judgment. Since it is not possible to discover that
which does not exist, specifically, whether the 3 1/2-year-old
twins would consent or refuse to consent to the proposed bone
marrow harvesting procedure if they were competent, the doc-
trine of substituted judgment is not relevant and may not be
applied in this case.1 46
The cases cited in the court's opinion147 were distinguished by using
the specific facts involved in each situation from Curran.14 In each of the
previous cases 149 when the court allowed the donation of an organ from
an incompetent child to their other sibling, there was an established
relationship between the children so that the death of the ill sibling would
have a severe effect upon the incompetent child both emotionally and
142 Curran v. Bosze, Memorandum Opinion 87 M1 4599, Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.,
Ch. Div. (1990).
143Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1345 (Ill. 1990). The court stated that
"it is not in the best interest of either Allison or James to undergo the proposed
bone marrow harvesting procedure in the absence of an existing, close relationship
withthe recipient, Jean Pierre, and over the objection of their primary caretaker,
Ms. Curran." Id.
" Id. at 1326. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text for a discussion
on the doctrine of substituted judgment.148 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d at 1322-1326.
146 Id. at 1326.
14, Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d
286 (Conn. 1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson,
284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Ct. App.
1979); In re Guardianship of Ebehardy, 307 N.W.2d 881 (Wis. 1981); In re Guard-
ianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 1975).
148 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1326-1331.
149Id.
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psychologically.1, In Curran, the twins did not know their half-brother
or their biological father, Mr. Bosze. 151 The court reasoned that the blood
test and the bone marrow harvesting procedure was not in the best in-
terest of the twins because their biological mother did not consent and
there was no family relationship between the twins and Jean Pierre.
The court in Curran recognized the rudimentary constitutional premise
that all lives are equal and protected, whether one is healthy or dis-
eased. 1 2 To subject a healthy child to bodily intrusions against the will
of the custodial parent in order to attempt to save a diseased child, how-
ever admirable 53 the motivation, is not a duty the courts seem willing
to impose. For the court to order tissue, blood or organ extraction from
one child for the benefit of another would seriously infringe upon and
forsake the constitutional rights of the child and in a sense render him
a victim.
The fact that the custodial parent did not consent contributed heavily
to the court's refusal to permit the blood test and eventual bone marrow
extraction. The court found the decision of the custodial parent to be an
important and persuasive factor.'5 ' The tribunal agonized with the plight
of the terminally ill child but emphatically stated:
[t]his court shares the opinion of the circuit court that Jean
Pierre's situation "evokes sympathy from all who've heard it."
No matter how small the hope that a bone marrow transplant
will cure Jean Pierre, the fact remains that without the trans-
plant Jean Pierre will almost certainly die. The sympathy felt
by this court, the circuit court, and all those who have learned
of Jean Pierre's tragic situation cannot, however, obscure the
fact that, under the circumstances presented in the case at bar,
it neither would be proper under existing law nor in the best
interests of the 3 1/2-year-old twins for the twins to participate
in the bone marrow harvesting procedure.
5
110 See supra note 37.
151 Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344.
112 Id. at 1319.
- Although the child does not have a direct voice in the decision, society would
deem this sacrifice to save the life of another sibling as admirable.
11 The court stated:
Allison and James would need the emotional support of their primary car-
egiver if they were to donate bone marrow. The evidence establishes that
it would not be in a 3 & 1/2 year old child's best interest if he or she were
required to go to a hospital and undergo all that is involved with the bone
marrow harvesting procedure without the consent reassurance and support
by a familiar adult known and trusted by the child .... Ms. Curran has
refused to consent to the twins' participation in donating bone marrow to
Jean Pierre. It appears that Mr. Bosze would be unable to substitute his
support for the procedure for that of Ms. Curran because his involvement
in the lives of Allison and James has, to this point, been a limited one.
Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1344.
115 Id. at 1345.
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The court used the traditional legal reasoning employed by other juris-
dictions in holding that an order to force the twins to submit to a blood
test and possible bone marrow harvesting at a later date would be an
invasion of their rights of privacy.
VI. FUTURE OF FORCED ORGAN DONATIONS BY PARENTS AND SIBLINGS:
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO SAVE THE LIFE OF ANOTHER AND AT WHAT COSTS?
Medical research will continue to present new and precedent-setting
challenges for the courts and society. One commentator so poignantly
stated:
[wihen a court is called upon to resolve a conflict among family
members, it must, in essence, make the final medical decision
for the patient. There is widespread recognition that a court-
room is not the proper forum for making treatment choices ....
judicial process [is] an unresponsive and cumbersome mecha-
nism for decisions of this nature. This fact is borne out by a
number of the leading cases in which arguments were heard
and opinions written long after the patient had died.- 6
For most parents, submitting their healthy child to an organ donation
to save the life of their diseased child is probably one of the most difficult
decisions any parent would have to consider. As seen in Curran, when
the biological parents are separated and the relationship between the
children may only be genetic, such issues are brought to the courts for
resolution. As the courts have stated many times, this is a "no win"
situation involving as it does the lives of children or incompetents.
Recently, a couple in California conceived a baby with the expressed
intention of utilizing the baby, if compatible, to be a bone marrow donor
to her ailing sister.157 This situation raises serious legal and ethical ques-
tions. For example: Is it ethical to conceive children expressly so that
they can be donors? Who will guard the rights of the infant donor: the
parents or a court appointed guardian? Since the child is specifically
conceived as a bone marrow donor, if fetal tests show that the baby's
marrow is not compatible can the parents choose abortion?
A question presented in the discussion of organ donation cases between
one child and another is: can the parents really be objective in balancing
one child's needs against another? Should we expect family members to
care so much about each other that they are willing to sacrifice themselves
to some extent? As medical science provides safer and less risky possi-
bilities in the organ donation context, parents and children may feel an
'5 Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment
Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985, 995 (1984) (quoting In re Welfare of Colyer, 660
P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1983)).
117 Anastasia Toufexis, Creating a Child To Save Another: A "Miracle Baby"
Promises Both Blessings and Controversy, TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 56.
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obligation to donate organs to save the life of another sibling if the risk
to their own life is minimal. The fact that the risk to the donee is less,
due to the advancement of medical science, will not make the decision
for a healthy sibling or parent to donate an organ easier. At best, the
decision to donate an organ will contemplate a possibility that the ill
sibling will survive with the newly donated organ.
Another case recently reported involves a small child and her father. 158
A small section of the father's lung was transplanted into the body of his
daughter.159 Physicians believe that the lung is regenerative and will
allow the little girl to live without harming the health of her father.
Another topic that has become an area of concern is the issue of fetal
tissue transplants.160 If parents can conceive a child specifically to become
a bone marrow donor, why can't they conceive a child to use fetal tissue
to be transplanted into a loved one?
This technique of using regenerative tissue in transplants appears to
be achieving higher success rates.16' However, in light of past cases, will
the courts impose a duty upon a parent to allow physicians to take re-
generative tissue from the parent's body to transplant into the body of
their dying child? Or perhaps from a sibling? When the parent consents
for himself or herself, the courts are more likely to take into consideration
the removal of regenerative tissue, or even kidneys. The problem arises
when the parents are consenting for an incompetent - either a small
child or a mentally defective person. Using the analysis of court deci-
sions,162 it would seem that the courts would allow it in some situations
and would not allow it in others.16s
VII. CONCLUSION
The gift of organs and tissues to another person is not a rare occurrence.
While cadavers are the chief source of transplanted body parts, because
of advances in medical science, living donors will frequently provide skin,
blood, bone marrow, kidney, and sections of intestines to close relatives.'"
158 Transplant patient OK, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 16, 1991, at 6.
159 Id.
160 Fetal tissue transplantation has been attempted for a limited number of
clinical disorders, including Parkinson's disease, diabetes, immunodeficiency dis-
orders, and several metabolic disorders. See R. Mark Evans, PhD and David
Orentlicher, MD, JD, Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 263
J.A.M.A. 565 (1990); Reiko Namikawa, MD, et. al., Long-term human hemato-
poiesis in the SCID-hu mouse, 172 J. Exp. MED. 4 (1990). See also Mark W. Danis,
Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HAST. L.J. 1079
(1988).
161 See supra notes 3 and 19.
162 See cases cited supra note 37 and accompanying text.
160 See cases cited supra note 37 and accompanying text.
14 The regenerative transplant procedures of livers and lungs are still exper-
imental. The procedures have been successful and in the future may become as
routine as kidney transplantation. See, e.g., supra notes 3 and 19.
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Indeed, cultural norms of obligation and gift-giving create strong pres-
sures for intra-family body gifts, particularly from sibling to sibling or
parent to child.165
How far the courts will go to save the life of a child may depend on the
interests at stake. Courts will consider the overriding state interest as
opposed to the constitutional right to privacy. However, the courts are
still hesitant to use the overriding state interest analysis and order organ
donations. With the advent of a more conservative Supreme Court, it is
conceivable that some rights may be subrogated to protect the rights of
the unborn. Does this signal a change of attitude on the part of the Court
to allow forced organ donation? A clear analogy could be made to the
organ donation circumstance where the life of an ill child might be saved
if the invasion of the healthy child was not so pervasive as to constitute
a constitutional invasion of privacy. Medical science will also play a vital
role in organ donation. As more of the medical procedures become routine,
non-threatening and less risky, the courts will gain some basis for de-
termining that the life of one child could be saved at a minimal risk to
another sibling.
Presently, the courts will not compel another person to have an invasive
procedure, such as an organ donation, even though death is undoubtedly
the result of their decision. As contemplated in the discussion above only
time will reveal whether the cost to save a life will be organ donation.
DAVID S. LOCKEMEYER
165 See John A. Robertson, Organ Donation by Incompetents and The Substituted
Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1976).
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